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Abstract
I describe a new, comparative, version of the argument from interpersonal varia-
tion to subjectivism about color. The comparative version undermines a recent objec-
tivist response to standard versions of that argument (Go´mez-Torrente 2014).
1 The argument from interpersonal variation in color judgments to subjectivism
about color
A central argument in support of the idea that colors are subjective—that they essentially
involve relations to perceiving subjects—is the argument from interpersonal variation in
how normal observers perceive color. One way of formulating the argument goes as fol-
lows:
1. There is widespread apparent disagreement among normal observers over what count
as “unique” hues in the blue-green range.1
2. There is no good reason to think that one normal observer’s judgment that x is unique
green (not at all bluish or yellowish) is veridical while another normal observer’s
judgment that x is not unique green (because it is bluish) is not. Either both judgments
are veridical, or neither is.2
3. The idea that neither judgment is veridical (perhaps because colors don’t exist) is
implausible.3
4. So we have reason to think that both judgments (x is unique green and x is not unique
green) are veridical.
5. But if both judgments are veridical, then they must not contradict one another.
6. The best way to avoid contradiction is to think of the contents expressed by x is
unique green and x is not unique green as subject-relative: as x is unique green to Wy
and x is not unique green to Zed. Those contents can both be true of the same object
at the same time.4
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2 A new objectivist response to the argument from interpersonal variation
Go´mez-Torrente (2014) offers a novel way for a defender of objectivism about color (which
he characterizes as the view that color properties do not essentially involve relations to per-
ceiving subjects) to respond to the argument from interpersonal variation while accepting
all of the argument’s premises (1-5). He does so by drawing an analogy between color ad-
jectives (“green”, “blue”, etc.) and gradable adjectives that measure objective magnitudes.5
A standard semantics for gradable (or scalar) adjectives like “tall” and “hot” associates
such adjectives with scales. A scale is a set of degrees ordered along some dimension
(height, temperature, etc.). Adjectives like “tall” and “hot” locate objects on a scale relative
to a context-sensitive standard: 35 degree water may count as “hot” for Zed, but may
not count as hot for Wy, for example.6 In such a situation, when Wy and Zed describe
something as “hot”, their intentions fix different standards that something must meet or
exceed on the scale of hotness in order to count as hot. (See figures 1 and 2, which are
based on Go´mez-Torrente (2014, figure 1).)
Figure 1: Wy’s standards on the dimension of temperature
40oC30oC
cold hot
Figure 2: Zed’s standards on the dimension of temperature
35oC25oC
cold hot
Figures 1 and 2 show that by setting the standards for what counts as “hot” in different
places, Wy and Zed can disagree over whether something is hot (e.g., water that is 35oC):
Wy will judge that it isn’t hot, and Zed will judge that it is. The adjectives “tall” and “hot”,
though they have standards that may differ between subjects, still order objects along scales
that measure objective dimensions: namely height and temperature, respectively. When
standards are set in different places on the scale of hotness, it is possible for two people to
make apparently contradictory judgments (x is hot and x is not hot), that are nevertheless
both veridical. When Zed says “x is hot” (in a context where his standard for what counts
as hot is being at least 35oC), he says something true just in case x has a temperature of at
least 35oC. When Wy says “x is not hot” (in a context where his standard for what counts
as hot is being at least 40oC), what he says is true just in case x doesn’t have a temperature
of at least 40oC. So when x is 35oC, Wy can truly say “x is not hot” and Zed can truly say
that “x is hot”.7 So even though the way content is “fixed” involves subjective aspects of
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speakers (their intentions, e.g.), the content that is thereby fixed can be objective (“x is hot”
is true just in case x has a temperature of at least 40oC, e.g.) (Go´mez-Torrente, 2014, p. 7).
Go´mez-Torrente’s central claim is that color adjectives operate the same way as “hot”
and “tall”: the appearance of interpersonal disagreements over whether something is unique
green or not stem from locating the relevant standard in different places on a scale of hue
that is a way of ordering degrees on an underlying objective dimension. Go´mez-Torrente
wants to remain neutral between competing objectivist accounts of what the colors are,
so he lets the variable h stand for a degree on whatever objective dimension (dominant
wavelength, e.g.) is supposed to correspond to the hue dimension. Different degrees on the
objective dimension can then be ordered into a scale of hues, as in figures 3 and 4 (which
are based on Go´mez-Torrente (2014, figure 2)).
If color adjectives like “green” have varying standards in the same way that “tall” and
“hot” do, then disagreements over whether some hue is unique green or not can be ex-
plained as disagreements over where the standards of greenness are located on the scale of
hues. So, for example, Wy may judge that x is unique green, while Zed judges that x is not
unique green (because it’s too blue). In so judging, Wy would be saying something true
just in case x is located between h0 (his standard for what makes something count as min-
imally blue) and h1 (his standard for what makes something count as minimally yellow)
(see figure 3). Zed’s judgment that h is not unique green would be true just in case x is not
located between h (his standard for what makes something count as minimally blue) and
h2 (his standard for what makes something count as minimally yellow). (See figure 4.)
If that approach is right, then the phenomenon of intersubjective variation in judgments
about unique hues is compatible with an objectivist view of color—it can be understood
as the result of locating the relevant standards for, e.g., “blue”, “green”, and “yellow” in
different places on the scale of hues.
Figure 3: Wy’s standards on the dimension of hues
h h1 h2h0
blue yellow
green
3 A Comparative Version of the Argument from Interpersonal Variation
Go´mez-Torrente provides a way for the objectivist about color to respond to the standard
argument from interpersonal variation in judgments about the unique hues to subjectivism
about color while hanging on to the plausible premises of the argument. But there is a
variant of the argument from interpersonal variation that shows that the objectivist can’t
embrace both the idea that color adjectives refer to an objective dimension of hue and that
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Figure 4: Zed’s standards on the dimension of hues
hh0 h1 h2
blue yellow
green
the conflicting judgments of normal observers are simultaneously veridical. The variant
of the argument involves comparative judgments of hue (x is greener than y), rather than
categorical judgments (x is unique green).
If Wy thinks that h is unique green, and Zed doesn’t, then they will also disagree about
whether h is greener than certain other objects or not. For example, Wy will find h greener
than h1, and Zed will find h1 greener than h (see figures 3 and 4). This is not just a difference
in where Wy and Zed locate their standards for greenness on the objective dimension that
is supposed to correspond to hue, it is a difference in how Wy and Zed order hues on scales
of greenness.
Contrast the fact that the scales Wy and Zed associate with “green” can be differently
ordered with the clearly objective scales that are associated with “tall” and “hot”: If Wy
and Zed disagree about which of two objects is taller or hotter, then one of them has to
be making a mistake. That’s because the scales associated with “tall” and “hot” align with
objective dimensions of height and temperature. Imagine how odd “tall” and “hot” would
look if it were possible for two people to (veridically) disagree about the ordering of degrees
on the dimensions of height and temperature:
• Wy: 40oC is hotter than 35oC.
• Zed: 40oC is not hotter than 35oC.
Only if Zed is using “hotter” (or one of the other words in the sentence) to mean something
idiosyncratic could what he says be veridical.
That’s not the case with color adjectives. Wy and Zed can disagree about the proper
ordering of objects in terms of how green they are while both still making veridical judg-
ments. That means that they are operating with different scales of greenness. The ordering
of a scale associated with a gradable adjective is an essential part of its meaning, as polar
antonyms like “hot” and “cold” make clear. “Hot” and “cold” share the same underlying
dimension (temperature), but order the degrees on that scale in different directions.
The objectivist could argue that the different ways that “cold” and “hot” order the un-
derlying objective dimension of temperature is in fact a good way of understanding the way
that different perceiving subjects can order the underlying objective dimension of hue.8 On
the standard semantics for gradable adjectives that Go´mez-Torrente invokes, a comparative
construction (“x is hotter than y”, “x is greener than y”) is true just in case x has a greater
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degree on the relevant scale (hotness, greenness) than y. “Hot” and “cold” order the under-
lying dimension of temperature in opposite directions, so that even if x and y have constant
temperatures, then both the judgment x is hotter than y and the judgment y is colder than x
can simultaneously be true: “y is colder than x” is true just in case y is closer to absolute
zero than x; “x is hotter than y” is true just in case x is further away from absolute zero than
y is. Maybe Wy and Zed’s different scales for greenness function in a similar way.
Wy’s judgment that h is greener than h1 is true just in case h is closer to what he
considers to be unique green (h) than h1 is. Assuming that identity is maximal closeness,
then because h is what Wy judges to be unique green, his judgment h is greener than h1
is true. Zed’s judgment that h1 is greener than h is true just in case h1 is closer to what
he considers to be unique green (h1) than h is. Since h1 is what Zed judges to be unique
green, then his judgment is true. And it might appear that the truth conditional content of
both judgments can be spelled out purely objectively, in terms of the objective properties
h and h1, with subjective features of Wy and Zed only playing a role in fixing the relevant
contents.
But a key aspect of the truth conditional content of the comparative color judgments,
the notion of closeness or proximity to unique green, can’t plausibly be defined without
invoking a subject-relative property, even once interpersonal differences in what counts as
unique green are fixed to objective properties (h or h1, e.g.). That’s because there can be
interpersonal variation in judgments about which hues (on the objective dimension of hue)
are closer to unique green.
For example, assume that Wy and Zed are participating in an experiment where they
are presented with spectral light stimuli, and that both judge that light at 516nm is unique
green.9 But even if they locate unique green in the same place on the objective dimension of
wavelength, they can disagree about whether, e.g., light at 510nm (shifted slightly towards
blue) or at 522nm (shifted slightly towards yellow) is greener (closer to unique green).
If both Wy and Zed’s judgment are veridical, then that means that closeness to unique
green can’t be defined in terms of distance along the dimension of wavelength (mutatis
mutandis for other candidates for the objective dimension that is supposed to correspond
with hues: dominant wavelength, surface spectral reflectance, etc.). A partial explanation
for the fact that this type of comparative variation is possible is the existence of lower-level
physiological differences between subjects (screening pigments or numbers of cone types,
e.g. (Malkoc et al., 2005, p. 2155)), or higher-level differences between subjects (past
visual experiences, e.g. (Hinks et al., 2007, p. 3371)).
So, assuming the veridicality of both Wy and Zed’s comparative judgments of hue, the
truth conditions for comparative judgments of hue (x is greener than y) involve an element
that can’t plausibly be spelled out in non-subject-involving terms, namely closeness to
unique green. That blocks Go´mez-Torrente’s attempt to show that subjective features only
play a content-fixing role and don’t contribute to the truth conditional content of judgments
involving color adjectives.
The argument from interpersonal variation can therefore be reformulated in compara-
tive terms, as follows:
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1. There is widespread apparent disagreement among normal observers over what count
as examples of unique hues in the blue-green range.
2. If there is widespread apparent disagreement among normal observers about the lo-
cation of unique hues in the blue-green range, then there is widespread apparent
disagreement among normal observers over comparative judgments of hue in the
blue-green range.
3. There is therefore widespread apparent disagreement among normal observers over
comparative judgments of hue in the blue-green range.
4. There is no good reason to think that one normal observer’s judgment that x is greener
than y is veridical while another normal observer’s judgment that y is not greener
than x is not. Either both judgments are veridical, or neither is.
5. The idea that neither judgment is veridical (perhaps because colors don’t exist) is
implausible.
6. So we have reason to think that both judgments (x is greener than y and x is not
greener than y) are veridical.
7. But if both judgments are veridical, then they must not contradict one another.
8. The best way to avoid contradiction is to think of the contents expressed by x is
greener than y and x is not greener than y as subject-relative: as x is greener than y
to Wy and x is not greener than y to Zed. Those contents can both be true of the same
object at the same time.
It is, of course, open to the defender of the objectivity of hue to respond to the com-
parative argument from interpersonal variation by rejecting premise (4), and arguing that
there is a reason to think that certain comparative judgments are veridical while others
are not. Such a response is a version of the standard objectivist response to the argu-
ment from interpersonal variation. So, for example, one might argue that someone who
judges that 516nm light is unique green but who judges that 522nm (slightly more yellow-
ish) light is greener than 510nm (slightly more bluish) light is simply making a mistake—
objectively, both 510nm and 522nm light are equally close to unique green, and therefore
equally green.10 But responding to the argument in that way eliminates the central appeal
of Go´mez-Torrente’s objectivist response to the argument from interpersonal variation—
namely, that it does not require simply overriding the judgments of normal observers with
an objective standard of correctness for judgments about color.
4 Multidimensionality?
Someone might respond to the previous line of argument by pointing out that there are ad-
jectives, like “big”, that order objects along obviously objective dimensions, and for which
there can be apparent disagreements about comparative judgments (of bigness), and for
which the comparative judgments can both be veridical. Wy and Zed might, for exam-
ple, disagree over who is bigger: Kareem Abdul-Jabbar (2.18m, 102kg), or Hulk Hogan
(2.01m, 137kg). If Wy’s scale for “big” gives more weight to height than mass, then he
can veridically judge that Abdul-Jabbar is bigger than Hulk Hogan. If Zed’s scale for “big”
gives more weight to mass than to height, then he can veridically judge the reverse.
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The existence of veridical comparative judgments about a property that seem to contra-
dict each other therefore doesn’t mean that the property can’t be objective. The apparent
disagreement can be explained in terms of different weightings assigned to the dimensions
that produce the scale on which objects are ordered. Perhaps comparative judgments about
color are like “big” in that respect.
Judgments about color are undoubtedly multidimensional, and some forms of apparent
disagreement over colors can be explained in terms of differences in relative weighting of
dimensions. So, for example, Wy and Zed may disagree over whether a yellowish green
(less green than a focal green in terms of hue) is more or less green than a pale mint
green (less green than a focal green in terms of saturation) because they assign different
weightings to the dimensions of hue and saturation in how they order objects in terms of
(overall) greenness.
But the variation in the new comparative argument from interpersonal variation relies
only on variation in judgments about hue, which for Go´mez-Torrente is mapped onto a
single objective dimension. So it’s not available to Go´mez-Torrente to explain the exis-
tence of apparently veridical, but conflicting comparative judgments in terms of different
weightings of dimensions.
5 Conclusion
In this brief essay I haven’t given direct support for the argument from interpersonal vari-
ation to subjectivism about color. My aim has been to show that Go´mez-Torrente’s recent,
appealing attempt to accept the premises of that argument while embracing objectivism
about color succeeds only if it is directed against a non-comparative version of the argu-
ment. Once the argument is couched in terms of interpersonal variation in comparative
judgments of hue, it is impossible to embrace the idea that the comparative judgments are
veridical without giving up on the idea that colors are objective properties.11
Notes
1Unique hues are “phenomenally simple”, meaning that they do not appear to be mix-
tures of other hues. A unique green, for example, does not appear to contain any blue or
any yellow (see Hardin 1988 for discussion). Go´mez-Torrente (2014, §1), Cohen (2004,
§3.2), and Cohen (2009, §2.3.2) (and citations therein) discuss the evidence in support of
the claim that there is widespread variation in where the unique hues are located. Allen
(2010) questions whether the empirical evidence actually supports the claim that there is
such widespread variation.
2Objectivists such as Byrne and Hilbert (2003), Byrne (2006) and Tye (2006) would
reject this premise.
3Eliminativists (Hardin 1988, e.g.) would reject this premise.
4The conclusion can be spelled out either in terms of indexical contextualism (Cohen,
2004) or “perspectivalism”, a form of non-indexical contextualism (Brogaard, 2010, 2012)
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according to which the truth of the invariant content x is unique green is relativized to
different perceiving subjects. See Cohen (2015) for discussion of the two views.
5Though his argument turns on features of color language, Go´mez-Torrente argues that
his conclusions about language extend to color experience on the “natural” supposition that
“the color properties signified by color words are represented by color experience” (p. 2).
6Go´mez-Torrente draws on the degree-based semantics for gradable adjectives given in
Kennedy (2007).
7The apparent disagreement between Wy and Zed in such a situation might be explained
in terms of a disagreement over what the relevant standard for being hot is or should be,
not what the temperature of the object is. See Plunkett and Sundell (2013) for a discussion
of this kind of “metalinguistic” disagreement.
8“Mild” is a temperature adjective that corresponds more closely with the structure of
color terms than “hot” and “cold”, because it involves a focal point that temperatures can
diverge from in two directions on the dimension of temperature: x can be milder than y
because it is colder than y (if y is hot), or because it is hotter than y (if y is cold). Thanks
to Mark Pinder and Je´re´my Zehr for discussion.
9See Volbrecht et al. (1997) for an example of an experiment evaluating the location of
unique hues involving spectral light against different backgrounds.
10Thanks to Mario Go´mez-Torrente and Mark Pinder for discussion of this possibility.
11Thanks to Zed Adams, Jonas A˚kerman, Jonathan Cohen, Mario Go´mez-Torrente, Jumbly
Grindrod, Wyeth Hansen, Melody Drummond Hansen, Eliot Michaelson, Chauncey Ma-
her, Mark Pinder, Je´re´my Zehr, and an anonymous referee for very helpful comments.
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